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RIGHTS, RATIONALITY, AND THE PREEMPTION OF
REASONS
RICHARD WARNER*

This seems obvious: an action is rational only if it can be justified
by showing that the reasons for it are better than (or at least as good
as) the reasons against it. Despite the appearance of obviousness, I
think this is false. What can I possibly have in mind? Surely it is obvious that an action qualifies as rational only if it can, in principle at
least, be justified by a comparison of relevant reasons. Suppose you
have two actions open to you-say, reading or watching TV. You
decide to read. I ask why. Insofar as your action is rational, you canin principle-answer by stating your reasons) So far, so good. What I
question is the following. Suppose that, as is almost always the case,
some reasons weighed in favor of the action you chose to performreading-while others weighed against it. Is it correct to hold that a
full answer to the question of why you chose to read would compare
the reasons and explain why one set outweighed the other? It seems
the answer must be "yes." Where reasons compete, it certainly seems
that rational action requires justifiability by a comparison of the reasons. Call this the "Comparative Conception." The conception is
false; or, more exactly, it is false on one critical understanding of it; on
another, it is indeed true.
Why does this matter? Discovering the truth about the nature of
reasons matters, of course, but there is another payoff as well. The
inquiry into reasons leads to a new-and much needed -perspective
on governmental decision-making. We generally take the Comparative Conception for granted in our approach to governmental decision-making, and it would appear that we do so for good reason. The
apparent good reason is that, in a democracy, a governmental decision maker "accepts the responsibility, among others, to explain,
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Professor of Law, Chair of American
Law, Catholic University of Lublin, Poland. This Article owes a great deal to my colleague,
Richard Wright, with whom I have for years discussed these issues.
1. The "in principle" is essential; there is no claim that you can immediately produce the
answer when asked, or that you thought of it before you acted. The claim is that you could
answer after sufficient unimpaired reflection.
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particularly to those who are adversely affected, why different treatment of others in other circumstances is not capricious or arbitrary or
discriminatory. '2 The ideal of legitimacy is the ideal of a government
that commands compliance, not through the threat of force, but because citizens, insofar as they are rational, see themselves as having
adequate reason to comply.3 How does a decision-maker demonstrate
that citizens have adequate reason to comply? How else but by articulating the reasons for the policy, and-especially to address the concerns of the adversely affected-explaining why those reasons are
better than (or at least as good as) the reasons for competing policies
that would have allocated costs and benefits differently? My claim is
that there is a "how else."
The route to this goal begins by considering a conflict between
moral rights and the Comparative Conception. Understanding and
resolving the conflict reveals critical features of the nature of reasons
and provides the basis for seeing how governmental decision-making
can meet the demands of legitimacy despite the falsity of the Comparative Conception.
I.

THE PREEMPTIVE CONCEPTION OF RIGHTS

Moral rights conflict with the Comparative Conception. They do,
that is, on one popular-and correct-conception of rights. The hallmark of this conception is that, as Thomas Nagel puts it,
the constraints on action represented by rights cannot be equivalent
to an assignment of large disvalue to their violation, for that would
make it permissible to violate such a right if by doing so one could
prevent more numerous or more serious violations of the same
right by others. This is not in general true. It is not permissible ...
to kill an innocent person even to prevent the deliberate killing of
three other innocent persons. A general feature of anything worthy
of being called a right is that it is 4not translatable into a mere
assignment of disvalue to its violation.
Assume, along with Nagel, that killing the one person violates a
right, where the "disvalue" from the violation is the death of that
person. Conceiving of the death as a "disvalue" inevitably raises the
2. Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality, in PRAGMATISM IN
LAW AND SOCIETY 359, 373-74 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).

3. The reasons in question are reasons other than the merely prudential reason of avoiding punishment by the state. See Richard Warner, Legal Reasoning,in BLACKWELL'S GUIDE TO
LAW AND LEGAL THIEORY (William Edmundson ed., forthcoming 2004).
4. Thomas Nagel, Libertarianism Without Foundations, 85 YALE L.J. 136, 144 (1975)
(reviewing ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974)).
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question, "Should we decide whether to kill this person by comparing
this disvalue to the value realized by saving three people?" Nagel
answers that this approach misconceives the nature of rights. If it is
really true that it is wrong to kill an innocent person even when the
value achieved is much greater than the disvalue of the death, then
sacrificing the innocent person violates a constraint on action that we
cannot properly violate. It is that type of constraint that we will call a
"right." A right is a constraint on action that is "not translatable into
a mere assignment of disvalue to its violation."
What kind of constraint is it? Joseph Raz offers the answer that
we will adopt and develop. The conflict with the Comparative Conception emerges from this answer. Like Nagel, Raz insists that rights
"are not reasons for action of a great weight." 5 They "are a
special
kind of requirement for action.. . [which,] while not necessarily more
weighty than other reasons, have a special peremptory force."' 6 Raz
explains peremptory force by considering
the case of two people who refer a dispute to an arbitrator. He has
authority to settle the dispute, for they agreed to abide by his decision.... [T]he arbitrator's decision is for the disputants a reason for
action. They ought to do as he says because he says so. But this reason is not.., just another reason to be added to the others, a reason to stand alongside the others when one reckons which way is
better supported by reason.... The arbitrator's decision
is ... meant to replace the reasons on which it depends. In agreeing

to obey his decision they agreed to follow his judgment of the balance of reasons rather than their own.... I shall call a reason which
displaces others a pre-emptive reason.7
Rights, according to Raz, provide a preemptive reason in this "displacement" sense. Torture illustrates the idea.
Grant, for the sake of argument, that torture violates the respect
due persons, a respect due them no matter what the circumstances;
and, grant that, consequently, a person-any person in any circumstance-has a right to not be tortured. It does not matter for our purposes if respect for persons is the true basis of the right, or even
whether the right actually exists. Now, imagine a terrorist has planted
a bomb in an elementary school, the location of which we do not
know. We have apprehended the terrorist, and we are certain that, if
we torture him, he will reveal the school's location in time to defuse
the bomb. There are strong reasons to torture. If we do not, 1000
5.

JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 195 (1986).

6. Id.
7. Id. at 41-42.
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children will suffer horribly and many will die terrible deaths. We owe
these children the same respect for persons we owe the terrorist.
There are 1000 of them and only one terrorist; the children are innocent, and the terrorist is a monster who has callously decided to kill
children. Suffering and death-and the violation of respect involved-is inevitable; the question is whether it should happen 1000
times or once. How can it be that the 1000 innocent do not outweigh
the wicked one?
The Preemptive Conception of rights answers that the issue is
not one of "outweighing." There is no "weighing"-no comparison of
reasons-to be done here. The right functions like the arbiter in Raz's
example. The right provides a reason not to torture, and we do, or at
least should, defer to this reason in the way Raz's disputants defer to
the arbitrator's decision. Consequently, we do, or should, regard ourselves as having a right-provided reason not to torture, and no reasons to do so; that is, no reasons that should play any determinative
role in our decision. The right-in Raz's terms-preempts those reasons.
This is the Preemptive Conception of rights. The conception offers a way of understanding how a right can be a constraint on action
that is "not translatable into a mere assignment of disvalue to its violation." In the torture case the "disvalue" from violating the right is
the pain we cause the terrorist (and the dehumanizing effects of torture on us). This "disvalue" provides us with a reason not to torture
while the imminent maiming and killing of the children provides us
with a reason to do so. To translate the right into "a mere assignment
of disvalue to its violation" is to think that we should decide whether
to torture the terrorist by comparing these two reasons. On the Preemptive Conception of rights, one who embraces the right not to
torture cannot decide in this way. Given that the right not to be tortured preempts the reason to torture provided by the maiming and
killing of the children, it follows that there is a right-provided reason
not to torture, and no countervailing injured-and-dead-children reason to do so, no reason, that is, that we should compare. To compare
that reason to right-provided reason is inconsistent with accepting the
reason-preempting constraint on action that is the right.
Of course, you may well ask how rights accomplish this reasonpreempting feat. Indeed, even if such reason-preemption is possible,
adherents of the Comparative Conception will-indeed, mustregard it as glaringly irrational. The risk of injury and death to the
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1000 children provides a reason to torture the terrorist. The Comparative Conception holds that your decision about whether to torture is rational only if it is justifiable by a comparison of relevant
reasons, the relevant reasons in this case being the risk to the children
and the right-provided reason not to torture. The Preemptive Conception of rights holds that one who accepts the right cannot consistently base a decision on such a comparison. Therefore, we must
reject either the Comparative Conception or the Preemptive Conception.
I reject the former. I offer an explanation of why the Preemptive
Conception is correct and the Comparative Conception mistaken. My
defense of the Preemptive Conception turns crucially on the claim
that-generally, not just in the context of rights-reason-preemption
is rational. The preemption that occurs in rights is just a special case
of this much broader reason-preemption phenomenon.
II. REASONS AND REASON-PREEMPTION
It is convenient to begin with an example of reason-preemption
outside the realm of rights. The reason-preemption that occurs in the
example is arguably irrational, but it provides a convenient background against which the rational cases of reason-preemption stand
out in relief. The example: Mason is a gourmet who works as a restaurant reviewer for newspapers and magazines. His doctor tells him
he has gout and must, on pain of destroying his health, stop eating the
rich French food in which he delights. But Mason persists in his
gourmet pursuits; he thinks of himself as a badly injured warrior who,
although doomed to defeat, defiantly refuses to cease fighting for his
ideal-the ideal for the gourmet Mason being the refinement of appetite as a source of pleasure. Mason takes this commitment to such an
extreme that he regards his reasons to live his gourmet life as preempting the reasons to preserve his health. The latter play no role
whatsoever in Mason's decisions about how to act. He takes pride in
this, seeing it as a sign of the depth of his commitment. Many, if not
most, will find Mason's commitment irrational. How could gourmet
pleasures, however refined, be worth destroying your health?
Despite the arguable irrationality, the example demonstrates that
reason-preemption can and does occur via commitments that lead us
to ignore reasons that we would otherwise take into account in determining how to act. One key to differentiating rational forms of
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reason-preemption from Mason's dubiously rational form lies in distinguishing two senses of "reason."
A.

Two Senses of "Reason"

To illustrate the first sense, suppose Smith devotes considerable
time to chess. When you ask him why, he explains that a well-played
game displays the beauty of forces in dynamic tension; the game reveals the creativity, courage, and practical judgment of the players in
an exercise of intuition and calculation akin to both mathematics and
art. These considerations are his reasons for his devotion to chess.
They are reasons in the sense that they play a certain justificatorymotivational role. If asked, for example, why he devotes time to
chess, he would (in principle) cite the above considerations as his justification. The same considerations motivate him to play chess, study
chess, go to the chess book sections of bookstores, and so on. In general, the considerations play a complex motivational-justificatory role.
It is sufficient for our purposes to note the existence of this role; we
need not characterize it in any detail. Call considerations that play
this motivational-justificatory role personalreasons.
Compare the chess-playing Smith to Jones, who cannot play
chess and has no interest in learning how to do so. The considerations
that comprise Smith's personal reason to play chess, the considerations that play a reason's characteristic motivational-justificatory role,
do not play that role for Jones. They are not personal reasons for him.
Jones can still acknowledge that the considerations are a reason, in
the sense that-in others-they play a reason's justificatorymotivational role. Call such considerations non-personal reasons.
Classification of considerations as personal or non-personal reasons is
agent-relative, of course. The chess considerations are a personal reason for me, but only a non-personal reason for Jones.
Of course, it may happen that considerations that do not in fact
serve as a personal reason should do so, nonetheless. Many will view
Mason, the gout-ridden gourmet, this way. Health considerations
related to his gout do not play the motivational-justificatory role of a
reason for Mason, but it may well be that they should, that Mason
should compare the health reasons to the gourmet reasons in deciding
what to do. Mason's friends try to convince him that he should do so,
and many will think the friends are correct. The enjoyment of food,
however refined it may be, is simply not that important. It is not as if
Mason were endangering his health to create great works of art.
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Typically, however, when considerations fail to serve as personal
reasons, it is not the case that they should. Smith's chess playing considerations, for example, should not play the motivationaljustificatory role of a reason for Jones. Jones has organized his life
around different commitments, and has no time or energy to devote
to chess, a pursuit which, in any case, would not further any of Jones'
plans and projects. There is no point to these being personal reasons.
B.

Rational Reason-Preemption:An Example

Now, how does this distinction between senses of "reason" help
reveal the rationality of reason preemption? An example is helpful. I
describe the example in some detail and then turn to the question of
why the preemption it illustrates is rational.
Suppose Jones and I are revolutionaries. An official in the government we oppose offers me $1,000,000 to reveal names, hiding
places, and plans of my fellow revolutionaries. I refuse. The official
then makes the same offer to Jones, who also refuses. He refuses
based on a comparison of personal reasons. Jones would use the
money to buy a yacht that he would sail around the world, and, in
light of this ambition, he regards the money as a personal reason to
betray the revolution. However, he also regards his loyalty as providing a personal reason not to betray the revolution. On reflection, he
finds the loyalty-provided personal reason not to betray to be better
than the money-provided personal reason to betray. However, as
Jones cheerfully acknowledges, had the price been higher, the result
would have been different. Had the offer been $10,000,000, he would
have betrayed the revolution without hesitation.
I might be thought to be relevantly like Jones. Indeed, suppose I
share Jones circumnavigational fantasy, and that I too would use the
money to buy a yacht and sail around the world. So don't I have a
personal reason to betray the revolution in order to get the money?
And, since I refuse the bribe, doesn't this mean that I must take my
loyalty-provided personal reason not to betray to be better than the
money-provided reason to do so? No. I refuse precisely because I do
not compare. My loyalty to the revolution consists in a commitment
to it that preempts the offered bribe as a personal reason to betray
the revolution. To say that my commitment preempts that reason as a
personal reason is just to say that it ensures that I have no attitude
toward the bribe that plays the motivational-justificatory role of a
personal reason. My commitment ensures this because it is
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constitutive of, definitive of, that commitment that I have no such
personal reason, just as Mason's refusal to consider the health reasons
was definitive of his commitment to his gourmet life. I refuse the
bribe because I have a loyalty-provided personal reason to do so, and
no competing personal reason weighing the other way.
One critical qualification: none of this is intended to deny that
there are some circumstances in which I might abandon my loyalty
for money. Suppose, for example, that I have a daughter and that she
will die if she does not receive medical treatment costing $1,000,000. I
might betray the revolution to get the money, but, in doing so, I
would still not be like Jones. Jones regards the offered bribe and the
pleasures in which it will allow him to indulge as a personal reason to
betray the revolution; I recognize saving the life of my daughter as a
personal reason to betray. This is consistent with regarding the bribeand-pleasure considerations as preempted, as not playing the role of a
personal reason. In general, my commitment can prohibit the bribepleasure considerations from functioning as a personal reason while
allowing me to allocate my time between caring for my family and
spying on the government, and allowing me to buy a new assault rifle
instead of the very safe, but very expensive, car in which to drive my
daughter to school. In preempting reasons, commitments set boundaries to comparison; they block comparisons we would otherwise
make. Such boundary-setting does not prohibit all comparison; that
would make life unlivable. Reason-preemption defines a line that
prohibits some comparisons, and the line may at times be a blurry,
indeterminate, and difficult to discern boundary. But, whatever
boundary gets defined, the point is that, given the reason-preempting
commitment, you cannot, cannot, consistently with the commitment,
compare the preempted considerations to the personal reasons you
recognize as legitimate bases for action.
Is it rational to be loyal in this reason-preempting way? Many
will think so. We admire reason-preempting loyalty, seek to associate
with such people, and regard it as a virtue to cultivate in our children.
Loyalty is hardly the only example. Reason-preempting commitments
are common in our lives. Parental love is another example. As Joseph
Raz remarks,
[flor many, having children does not have a money price because
exchanging them for money, whether buying or selling, is inconsistent with a proper appreciation of the value of parenthood ....
[Bloth their rejection of the idea that having children has a price
and their refusal even to contemplate such exchanges are part of
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their respect for parenthood, an expression of the very high value
which they place on having children." 8
Parental love, for many at least, is defined in part by the preemption of money as a personal reason to exchange their children.
Suppose that, as I am out walking with my daughter, a stranger approaches and offers me $1,000,000 if I will turn her over to him and
never see her again. I have a reason to take the money: I would pay
off bills and invest the rest. These considerations do not play the motivational-justificatory role of a personal reason for me. They might
motivate me to take the money-although I hope they would not. But
they would never play the justificatory role of a personal reason. I
would never actually weigh the advantages of having the money
against my personal reasons to keep my daughter, prepared to abandon her should the comparison come out in favor of taking the
money. My commitment to her ensures that I will never abandon
her-no matter how the comparison comes out. That comparison can
play no justificatory role in determining what I do. So my decision is
simple: I have a personal reason not to sell (my love for my daughter), and no personal reason to do otherwise; accordingly, I refuse the
stranger's offer. Such reason-preemption defines in part parental
love; indeed, we regard parents for whom such preemption does not
occur as monsters.
Parental love is by no means an isolated example. Raz makes a
similar point about friendship: "[o]nly those who hold the view that
friendship is neither better nor worse than money, but is simply not
comparable to money or other commodities are capable of having
friends." 9 Is the reason-preemption involved in loyalty, parental love,
friendship and the like sufficient to show that reason-preemption can
be rational? It is difficult to imagine that loyalty, parental love, and
friendship are somehow irrational. While the appeal to such examples
might convince us that reason-preemption can be rational, it does not
show us why it is. To understand why reason-preemption is rational,
we need to understand why reason-preempting commitments like
loyalty, parental love, and friendship lie at the center of our lives. The
key here is the concept of the self.

8. RAZ, supra note 5, at 348.
9. Id. at 352 (emphasis in original).
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III. REASON-PREEMPTION AND THE SELF

William James captures the relevant sense of identity. "I am,"
James writes,
often confronted by the necessity of standing by one of my empirical selves and relinquishing the rest. Not that I would not, if I could,
be both handsome and fat and well dressed, and a great athlete, and
make a million a year, be a wit, a bon-vivant, and a lady-killer, as
well as a philosopher; and a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and
African explorer, as well as a "tone poet" and saint. But the thing is
simply impossible. The millionaire's work would run counter to the
saint's; the bon-vivant and the philanthropist would trip each other
up; the philosopher and the lady-killer could not well keep house in
the same tenement of clay. Such different characters may conceivably at the outset of life be alike possible to a man. But to make any
one of them actual, the rest must be more or less be suppressed. So
the seeker of his truest, strongest, deepest self must review the list
carefully, and pick out the one on which to stake his salvation. All
other selves thereupon become unreal, but the fortunes of this self
are real. Its failures are real failures, its triumphs real triumphs,
carrying shame and gladness with them.10
One makes oneself the kind of person one is by one's commitmentswhat one "stands by."
The essential point is that reason-preemption plays an important
role in the commitments through which we define our personal identities. To see why, consider first that the contingent circumstances in
which we happen to find ourselves play a major role in determining
what self-defining commitments we make. Your parents, your education, and your place of birth, for example, could determine in large
part that you are committed to being a lawyer, a hard worker, and an
I-will-live-only-in-New-York New Yorker; and, the opportunities
your life happens to offer may lead you to alter these commitments;
to pursue your career as a lawyer, you might, for example, abandon
New York for Los Angeles. Reason-preempting commitments provide some relief from the impact of the ruthless contingencies on our
identities. It frees us from definition by a contingent sequence of circumstances. Reason-preemption allows us to define ourselves to ourselves and in relation to others in ways that provide some
independence from the happenstance and accidents of our lives.

10. 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 309-10 (Dover Publications
1950) (1890). The artless sexism of the times ("a man," "lady-killer") should perhaps not go
without comment. I discuss self-defining commitments in detail in RICHARD WARNER,
FREEDOM, ENJOYMENT, AND HAPPINESS 53-118 (1987).
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Marriage is an example. Suppose a married man routinely compares the women he meets to his wife, and that, if he found one of
them sufficiently superior in his eyes to his wife, he would divorce
her. The man's attitude is inconsistent with marriage, at least with the
ideal marriage relationship. That ideal is defined by a reasonpreempting commitment. The romantic commitment that is part of
the ideal marriage relationship (at least one popular conception of
that ideal) is defined by commitment that, across a broad range of
circumstances at least, preempts, as personal reasons to leave your
spouse, the considerations provided by the attributes of others. Marriage partners with mutual commitments in this regard build a relationship based on the trust the commitments make possible. Without
the commitment, the mere happenstance of whom you happened to
meet could dictate to you a sequence of more or less unenduring relationships. The marriage commitment frees you from this tyranny of
contingent encounters. It allows the couple to choose and create a
relationship that would not be possible without it; the world does not
dictate who their partners shall be; they do.
Similar remarks hold for the loyalty example. Reasonpreempting loyalty generates trust. Suppose that the revolutionaries
are a secret cell of high-placed government officials. Each has ample
opportunity to betray the others, where betrayal promises a safe and
financially secure future. The revolutionaries nonetheless adhere to
their agenda, which puts their lives in each other's hands. They do so
because each trusts that none of them has secretly betrayed the rest.
The trust exists because they know, and know that they know, that
each has a commitment to their revolutionary task that preempts the
considerations that argue for betrayal. Compare the marriage example. In deciding to get married, you have a choice between the freedom conferred by a reason-preempting commitment to another, or
the freedom to have a series of monogamous relationships with
different partners. In deciding to join the revolution, you have a
choice between a reason-preempting commitment to a cause or the
openness to contingent opportunities which that commitment would
foreclose. In both examples, the reason-preempting commitment allows you to define yourself in a way that provides some freedom from
the impact of contingent circumstances on the formation of your identity. You dictate to the world, not the world to you, the kind of person
you are.

CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW

[Vol 79:1091

Imagine a person, call him Smith, with no reason-preempting
commitments whatsoever. Smith is devoid of the commitments to
others exemplified in friendship, parental love, marriage, loyalty, and
the like. He would support or abandon people depending on a comparison of personal reasons-where no relevant reason is preempted.
He would always consider betraying others for money, and would do
so if the price were right. Whether Smith is helpful, hurtful, or indifferent to others depends on the reasons he finds for his actions in the
contingent circumstances he encounters. In this way, the world dictates to Smith, not Smith to the world, the nature of his relationships
to others. He is, in this way, unfree. We are not like Smith. We embrace reason-preempting commitments so that we determine our
identities in at least partial freedom from the contingencies that otherwise shape us.
Is this rational? How could it not be? How could it be irrational
to use our freedom to make ourselves capable of friendship, loyalty,
parental love, and marriage? Some will insist that there is no mystery
here. It is rational to do so insofar as our choice of reason-preempting
commitments is itself justifiable by a comparison of reasons. Consider
the marriage example. Suppose you are deciding whether to get married. You have a choice between two forms of freedom. The freedom
involved in marriage, or the freedom to have a series of relationships
with different partners. The Comparative Conception insists that,
insofar as you are rational, you can in principle justify your choice by
showing that the reasons (personal or non-personal) for it are better
than the reasons (personal or non-personal) against it. How can this
be false here? Surely it is irrational to choose either option without
comparing the reasons (whether personal or non-personal) for each
choice.
This insistence on comparison is untenable; it is simply not possible in all cases to justify our choices of reason-preempting commitments by a comparison of relevant reasons. There are two questions
to distinguish here. Can we sometimes compare reasons-both personal and non-personal-for and against having a commitment? Second, can we always compare reasons-both personal and nonpersonal-for and against having a commitment? The answer to the
first question is clearly "yes." Suppose you are considering a choice
between a career as a jazz pianist and a career as a lawyer. This is a
choice between two commitments-a commitment to the jazz pianist
life-plan, or a commitment to the lawyer life-plan. There might be
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compelling reasons that one commitment is better than another. You
might, for example, be unhappy as a jazz musician but not as a lawyer;
or perhaps as a jazz pianist you would create brilliant musical scores
in which many would take pleasure while as a lawyer you would actually do great harm by defending polluting corporations."
Now, can we always compare reasons for and against having a
commitment? We cannot. Consider the jazz pianist/lawyer example
again. It could be that no such grounds distinguish the two careers.
Imagine that you have values that pull you toward the lawyer-life.
You value stability in personal and financial matters, and you value
the role lawyers play in the legal system. Consequently, there are reasons for you to choose the life as a lawyer. The reasons may be personal or non-personal, depending on whether they happen to play the
appropriate motivational-justificatory role. It does not matter
whether they do so or not; all that matters is that the reasons exist.
The point to emphasize is that there are also reasons-personal or
non-personal-for you to choose the life of a jazz musician. You have
values that pull you toward that life. You adhere to an ideal of creative expression in music, an art for which you have a deep love. From
the perspective provided by the lawyer-values, you have better reason
to choose to be lawyer rather than a jazz musician, and from the perspective provided by the jazz-musician-values, you have better reason
to be a musician. To choose either career is to consign the values realized in the other career to a minor-and perhaps eventually vanishing-role. You are pulled both ways, and your problem is that your
current point of view includes both sets of values and does not provide any neutral perspective from which to adjudicate between the
competing reasons. There is no neutral perspective from which you
can regard one set of reasons as better, worse, or equally good. You
need to arrive at-to construct-such a perspective. Until you are able
to do so, you oscillate uncomfortably between the alternativesunable to decide, but pulled toward this one, then that one. Note that
you would be unlikely to adopt an arbitrary decision procedure like
flipping a coin; or, if you did, it would not be a sign of indifference,
but of desperation, of an inability to decide in any other way. You
seek a clarification and resolution in your values that cannot be
achieved by flipping a coin.

11.

See RAZ, supra note 5, at 341-42.
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Such situations are not uncommon. Our values hardly provide
complete maps that guide us through the decisions we must make;
rather, they are sketches leaving large areas barely filled in, if filled in
at all. Moreover, our perspectives not atypically incorporate competing, or outright inconsistent, claims and views. David Wiggins has
aptly captured these aspects of practical reasoning:
No theory, if it is to recapitulate or reconstruct practical reasoning
even as well as mathematical logic recapitulates or reconstructs the
actual experience of conducting or exploring deductive argument,
can treat the concerns which an agent brings to any situation as
forming a closed, complete, consistent system. For it is of the
essence of these concerns to make competing and inconsistent
claims. (This is a mark not of irrationality but of rationality in the
face of the plurality of ends and the plurality of human goods.) The
weight of the claims represented by these concerns is not necessarily fixed in advance. Nor need the concerns be hierarchically
ordered. Indeed, a man's reflection on a new situation that confronts him may disrupt such order and fixity as had previously
existed, and bring a change in his evolving conception2 of the
point... or the several or many points, of living or acting.'
Incomplete and inconsistent values mean that we cannot always
compare reasons as better, worse, or equally good. As the jazz musician/lawyer example illustrates, this may, and often does, happen in
choices among commitments, including reason-preempting commitments. Indeed, it is easy to conceive of the jazz musician/lawyer
choice as a choice among reason-preempting commitments. Imagine
that your envisioned commitment to being a jazz musician is defined
in part by preempting considerations of financial security as reasons
to take substantial amounts of time away from composing and playing
music; and, imagine that your envisioned commitment to being a lawyer is defined in part by preempting composing and playing music as a
reason to take substantial time away from the practice of law.
Given that the choice of reason-preempting commitments can
nonetheless be rational, the rationality of such a choice cannot ultimately depend on justifiability through a comparison of relevant reasons. This hardly means that our choices are unsupported by reasons,
or that we do not reason about them. You can choose to be a lawyer
or a jazz musician for reasons, for the reasons discussed in the example. Your choice to be a lawyer is backed by reasons and is in that

12. David Wiggins, Deliberationand PracticalReason, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS
221, 233 (Am6lie Okscnberg Rorty ed., 1980) (citation omitted).
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sense rational. The point is simply that there is no comparison of reasons that decisively decides the issue one way or another.
Some may object that we have not yet shown that a relevant
comparison of reasons is impossible. Our impossibility argument
turns on the claim that our values are incomplete and inconsistent.
But isn't it possible to fill in our values where they are incomplete and
eliminate the inconsistencies? Grant, for the sake of argument, that it
is. That would still not be enough to enable us to compare reasons; we
also need all the information relevant to the comparison. In the jazz
musician/lawyer case, for example, you need sufficient information
about what would happen in the two lives, and it is extremely unlikely
that you will have such detailed information. But grant, for the sake
of argument, that it is possible to have all the information relevant to
choosing among possible commitments. It would then be possible in
principle to compare reasons for and against commitments. This possibility is, however, simply irrelevant to the rationality of our choice
among commitments. We will, in fact, never make our values complete and consistent, and we will never possess all the information we
need, so we will never know what the result of the complete, consistent, fully informed comparison is. Hence, given that we can know
that our choices of commitments are rational, we cannot show that by
appeal to such a comparison. We must do so without appeal to such a
comparison. A choice among possible commitments can be rational
even in the absence of a comparison of reasons that shows that the
reasons for the chosen commitment are better (or at least as good as)
the reasons for any of the other commitments.
This result is inconsistent with the Comparative Conception.
Choice of commitments can be rational in the absence of any relevant
comparison, and, once you opt for a reason-preempting commitment,
you cannot, consistently with that commitment, consider the reasons
it preempts. So why does the Comparative Conception seem so plausible? The answer is that there are two ways to understand the Comparative Conception, corresponding to the two senses of "reason."
According to the Comparative Conception, if an action is rational for a given person, then it can, in principle, be justified by
showing that the reasons -personal or non-personal-for performing
the action are better than (or at least as good as) the reasonspersonal or non-personal -against performing it. Given that reasonpreemption is rational, this is false. To state the Comparative Conception correctly, we must restrict "reason" to reasons that are, or should
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be, personal reasons-thus: if an action is rational for a given person,
then it can, in principle, be justified by showing that the personal reasons the person does or should have for performing the action are
better than (or at least as good as) the personal reasons the person
does or should have against performing it. Confusing these two versions of the Comparative Conception makes reason-preemption look
irrational.
Now what does all this have to do with rights?
IV. RIGHTS

Return to the torture example. Suppose the terrorist in our example claims that he has the right not to be tortured, and suppose
that he is correct. What does his claim mean? To claim the right not
to be tortured is to make two claims: first, that others have a reason
not to torture; second, that this reason has a special status that ensures that in all-or at least most -circumstances what we have the
best reason to do is not to torture, no matter what reasons we may
have to do so. These claims are true if we share a reason-preempting
commitment to respect other persons, where that commitment is defined in part by the preemption of the prevention of harm to others as
a reason to torture. Suppose, for the moment, that we do share such a
commitment. This explains why, to use Nagel's words, a right is a constraint on action that is "not translatable into a mere assignment of
disvalue to its violation." Suppose, for example, that, in the terrorist
hypothetical, our right-provided reason not to torture preempts the
harm-and-injury-to-the-children reason to do so; then, insofar as we
are rational, we will refuse to torture. We have a reason not to torture, and no competing reason-no competing reasons that we will
consider-weighing the other way.
This approach also explains why some may choose to torture the
terrorist. There are two ways this may happen. First, suppose that our
commitment to respect persons preempts-only in a certain range of
circumstances-harm to others as a reason to torture. If the bomb in
the elementary school falls outside that range, respect for persons
does not preempt the harm-and-injury-to-the-children reason to torture; and, this reason may, at least in the eyes of some, provide a
powerful reason to torture. In general, reason-preempting commitments are, as noted earlier, typically limited by an "only in certain
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circumstances" qualification, 3 where the exact range of reasonpreemption is often unclear and a matter of moral debate. It is easy to
imagine such debate occurring in the terrorist example; someone is
likely to say, "I am against torture in most cases, but not here." The
second path to opting for torture is more radical: we completely
abandon our commitment to respecting persons. This is unlikely to
happen in the case of respect for persons, but it is a possibility, and
one that may be realized in the case of other commitments.
We should accept this approach to explaining rights. The approach explains why a right cannot be thought of as simply an indication of a significant disvalue to its violation, and it explains why we
nonetheless can "override" rights in appropriate circumstances. The
foundation of the explanations is the unavoidable, freedom-securing
role of reason-preempting commitments in our lives. Rights turn out
to be a special case of this broader reason-preemption phenomenon.
The explanation is still incomplete, however. In offering the explanation, we simply assumed that we shared a reason-preempting commitment to respect other persons, where that commitment is defined
in part by the preemption of the prevention of harm to others as a
reason to torture. What explains such shared commitments? There is
a contingent, cultural explanation. It is true (or has been true) in our
culture that, as a result of formal education and informal socialization, most people do share such a commitment. If we are content to
regard rights as simply cultural artifacts, we may be content with this
sort of explanation. If we are not-as I am not-so content, we must
show that there are reason-preempting commitments which govern
our treatment of others in the ways rights require, and which any person must have to qualify as rational. I think it is possible to demonstrate this, but that is a project for another time. We conclude with
the question of the impact of our understanding of rights -culturally
relative or universal-on the making of public policy.
V.

PUBLIC POLICY

Public policy decisions typically require overriding rights. Consider decisions about funding medical research. How much should the
state invest in research aimed at preventing heart disease, and how
much in research for a more effective flu vaccine? Suppose (as is in
fact true) that there is not enough money to give both programs all
13. Seesupra Part II.
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that they should ideally have. If we favor heart disease research over
flu vaccine research, thousands of flu victims (primarily elderly) will
die, victims the research would have saved; on the other hand, if we
favor flu research, thousands of heart disease patients will die, patients that would otherwise have been saved. Our reasons to save the
heart disease victims are reasons to let the flu victims die, and vice
versa. How do we decide which reasons are better?
The question is impossible to answer if we assume that our respect for persons is in part defined by preempting saving one life as a
reason to let another die. I assume that most of us do share some
commitment of this sort. Recall Thomas Nagel's observation that "it
is not permissible... to kill an innocent person even to prevent the
deliberate killing of three other innocent persons." Most certainly
agree, and most would still agree (to some perhaps a more qualified
version of the claim) when we replace "deliberate killing" with
"knowingly adopt a course of action that will cause the death of innocent people." Indeed, knowingly adopting such a course of action is
what the courts and the public found so horrific about Ford Motor
Company's behavior in the Ford Pinto case. 14 Ford knowingly
adopted a course of action that caused the death of innocent people.
Knowing that a defect in the Pinto would cause innocent deaths, Ford
nonetheless decided not to recall the cars and fix the defect. Assume
then-for the moment-that our respect for persons is defined in part
by the preemption of saving one life as a reason to let another die.
To see why this commitment makes it impossible to decide how
to allocate funds between the heart victims and flu victims, suppose I
proposed saving the heart disease victims. You respond, "But that
means letting the flu victims die." I answer, "Yes, but we do not have
enough money to save everyone, and the reasons to save the heart
disease victims and let the flu victims die are better than the reasons
to save the flu victims and let the heart disease victims die." You
point out that I have just violated our commitment to respect persons.
That commitment requires we not treat saving one group as a reason
to let the other group die.
So how do we decide who lives and who dies? Limited financial
resources mean that we cannot avoid the decision. There is only one
way out of this dilemma. We must revise our commitment to respecting persons. We could do so by holding that our respect for persons is
14. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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in part defined by preempting-in certain circumstances only-saving
one life as a reason to let another die. Where there is no alternative to
letting one die to save another, we could hold that the reasons are not
preempted. This is, indeed, precisely the difference between the Ford
Pinto example and the heart disease/flu example. Ford had an alternative; it simply had to recall the Pinto. The reason-preempting commitments that underlie our recognition of rights are almost always
qualified by an "under a certain range of circumstances" rider; the
reason is the need to deal with situations like the heart disease/flu
example, where we think we should compare the otherwise preempted reasons.
Determining the relevant range of circumstances raises issues
about our collective identity as a society. Suppose, for example, that it
would greatly promote economic development to allow industrial
pollution that would deposit a small amount of lead in drinking water.
Assume one consequence would be retarded mental development in
one out of every 1000 infants in the relatively small residential area
that would be affected. Many will surely object, "You can't intentionally retard innocent infants for economic gain, no matter how great
the gain." Interpreted in our terms, this reaction asserts that our
commitment to respect for persons preempt economic gain as a
reason to mentally retard infants. Assuming we have such a commitment, proponents of economic gain must argue that we should revise
it by holding that, in the circumstances, we should not preempt economic gain as a reason to retard the infants. In making such arguments, they are not-directly or primarily-comparing the reasons to
benefit economically against the reasons to protect the health of
infants; they are arguing about what it means to respect persons. If
they convince us to revise our commitment, then we can begin to
weigh the economic benefit against the mental retardation of the
children. What is at issue is our collective identity as a society. Just as
our individual reason-preempting commitments define our individual
identities, our shared commitments define our collective identity. The
question raised by the lead-in-the-drinking-water example is, do we
wish our collective identity to be defined in part by a willingness to
mentally retard infants for economic gain? Unfortunately, explicit
attention to reason-preempting commitments plays virtually no role
in the theory or practice of public policy choices. This Article is a plea
to give such commitments a central role in both theory and practice.

